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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 12/02/2004 Accident number: 120 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 21/05/1999 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 12/02/2004 Date  last modified: 12/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




An Internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999. 
There was no country MAC. 
The accident occurred in the "Ploughshear" section of a minefield between Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. Laid during the 1970s, the extensive minefield was last maintained in the early 
1980s. Most mines are R2M2, VS50 and M969 blast mines. The demining group were 
clearing the area using two-man teams and a one man drill. They routinely “disarmed” all 
R2M2 mines by removing the booster charge. 
The victim was the one of a two-man team and was supposed to be "controlling" his partner 
who was in the clearance lane. The victim claimed that he had noticed an object "that he did 
not recognise" and prodded it with a piece of wire when it exploded. He sustained "lacerations 
and some light fragment damage to his hands… deep lacerations and damage to his left 
thumb and forefinger and lighter lacerations to his right middle finger". 
[From observation at the site, I infer that because the victim was observing he was not 
wearing a visor. It is very likely that he was not wearing his protective apron either.] 
Medical Orderlies bandaged his wounds within five minutes and took the victim in the Team 
Ambulance to the Site Doctor within ten minutes. The victim's injuries were assessed as light 
and treated at the field medical facility where it was decided that he should go to hospital to 
reduce the risk of infection. The victim was taken to hospital in an ordinary vehicle so that the 
ambulance could stay on site and work continue (mines had still to be destroyed). The victim 
was accompanied by a driver and a "medical orderly" to Karanda hospital. 
All work at the site was halted while the accident was dealt with. 
The accident site was examined by the Team Leader who found a charred rock and some 
plastic fragments and a stone in the ground that "also had charring". The fragments were 
identified as parts of the "surrounds of the percussion cap" of an R2M2 mine.  
 
[The detonator/percussion cap is set into clear plastic as shown in the picture above, which 
shows the entire metal content of the mine]. 
The investigator visited the victim in hospital later the same day and found that the victim’s 
wounds had been "sutured and dressed" and that the victim could return to camp the same 
day. 
The investigator thought that the victim's story of prodding the unknown object with wire was 
"improbable". He stated that "the most likely cause is that he was holding the object between 
the thumb and forefinger of the left hand and struck the object with the right hand using the 
other stone found at the site which he held in an over hand grasp". [This may imply a lack of 
understanding on the part of the investigator because the detonator is not an “impact” type 
but a “stab-sensitive” type.] 
The investigator reported that "radio traffic" was confusing at the later stages of the accident 
and ascribed the cause to sharing the "net" with another team that were still working. 
The investigator, who was in charge of the site, also criticised his own failure to brief the 
remaining crew at the site thoroughly about the situation. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigator concluded that the accident "occurred outside the minefield" while the victim 
was supposed to have been "observing" his partner. Further, the device involved was an 
R2M2 booster and although deminers had been told to report all unfamiliar objects, he felt the 
device may have appeared "innocent" to the victim. He found the victim's version of events 
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"flawed" and did not accept it. He added that the vehicle taking the victim to hospital should 
have been in radio contact so that his progress could be relayed to those left behind. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigator recommended that the victim should be suspended without pay during 
convalescence and given a "category C written warning". He also recommended that the 




Victim number: 156 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 




See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An internal report from the Project Medical Doctor was made available. This brief report 
stated that the victim "sustained lacerations bilateral hands (multiple)" and that "debridement 
and laceration suturing" had been done. He returned to the demining group's camp on the 
same day as the accident occurred.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was in breach of SOPs and his actions were not corrected by his supervisor. It seems likely 
that the victim did not recognise the detonator from the most common mine found at the site. 
These mines were routinely disarmed with their boosters removed. The detonator would not 
usually fall out, but may have in this case (alternatively it may have come from a broken mine 
or been thrown out a pit during demolition by burning). The victim's apparent ignorance of its 
appearance implies a training lack that would be a management failing. The investigator’s 
ignorance of how it functioned was a further lack of training. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate training”. 
The investigation was carried out by the Site Supervisor at the time, and it is unique for him to 
have included a criticism of his own actions, so demonstrating more objectivity than most. 
However, the punishment of the victim was unusual given that those responsible for ensuring 
that site discipline was effective were not criticised or held in any way responsible. 
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It is a further failing that the source of the detonator was not investigated, especially as it may 
have been thrown out of a burning pit when mines “popped-off” during demolition. 
 
The picture above shows a cut-away drawing of the stab-sensitive detonator,. It is easily 
initiated by prodding it with any hard object, such as a piece of stick or wire. 
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